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the Court in its analysis of the instant case. They are rightly circumvented,
however, by the Court's holding that the adequacy of constructive service
rests solely on its reasonable probability of giving actual notice. The
trustee, in the instant case, knew the whereabouts of the known beneficiaries.
They were given notice by mail when the trust was established. The in-
convenience, incidental to mailing notice, should not relieve the trustee
of his obligation to give notice where reasonable. Expediency in the ad-
ministration of complex trusts is desirable, but the safeguard of our con-
stitutional guaranty of due process of law should not be disregarded to
achieve this end.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT-NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVIT REQUIRED OF
UNION OFFICERS
Noncompliance by the unions with the requirements of § 9(h) of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947' raised the issue of constitution-
ality of the provision. The section establishes, as a condition precedent to
the use of the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board, the filing
of an oath by each official of the labor union that he is not a member of,
or affiliated with, the Communist party and that he does not believe in
the overthrow of the government by force or support any organization that
so believes or teaches. Failure of union officers to supply such affidavits
in one case resulted in dismissal of an action by the union to enjoin an
election in which its name did not appear on the ballot.2 Refusal to comply
with the requirement in another situation prevented enforcement of a Board
order requiring the company involved to bargain on pension matters.3 The
two cases were considered simultaneously by the Court. Held, that § 9(h)
of the Labor Management Relations Act does not unreasonably abridge
individual freedoms and thus is compatible with the Federal Constitution.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, rehearing
denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1017 (1950).
The Act was designed to remove obstructions to the free flow of com-
merce. 4 The power of Congress to protect interstate commerce has been
established. However, the method chosen by the enactment of § 9(h) to
prevent dangerous political strikes necessarily met with objection from those
who found their liberties somewhat lessened thereby. The labor'group was
encouraged to chose officers who would sign the affidavits or it might not
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended 61 Stat. 146 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1949) (Taft-Hartlcy Act).
2. Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union Local No. 65 v. Douds, 79 F. Supp.
563 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
3. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
4. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5. Ibid.
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take advantage of the facilities offered under the other sections of the Act.
The individual officer candidate had to be careful to affiliate himself prop-
erly and be willing to take the oath or he probably would not be considered
for such a position. So, rights of the members to elect, of the officer to
believe and to join other groups, and of the union to act were touched by
this Congressional remedy. And the Court was faced with a problem as to
whether these infringements on individual freedom were within the bounds
of constitutionality.
One of the major grounds for attack has been the contention that the
requirement is a violation of the First Amendment. 6 However, the manner
in which this abridgment of the right of free speech operates has been con-
ceived differently by those who have considered it. In a case which was af-
firmed by the Supreme.Court without passing on the validity of the pro-
vision of § 9(h) the dissenting opinion of the lower federal court labelled
the portion of the oath directed at members of the Communist party as
an infringement of free speech.' Justice Jackson in his partial dissent from
the opinion in the instant case found that another portion of the oath-the
part requiring a statement of belief-was the offending section,8 while
justice Black's dissenting opinion pointed out that the entire affidavit was
a dangerous breaking down of individual liberties as set up in the Bill of
Rights.9
Although the freedoms protected by the First Amendment are not
considered absolute, the clear and present danger test has been applied
in free speech cases to prevent curbing of individual rights when not justi-
fied by imminent harm to the public.' The test has been applied by the
courts to determine whether the liberty of-the individual or the good of
the public is to be deemed paramount in specific cases of conflict.1' it has
been stated that in the application of the test the usual presumption of
constitutionality of legislation is reversed in favor of the careful guarding
of the individual liberties which form such an important part of the Amer-
ican philosophy.12 On the other hand, it has been insisted just as strongly
that, even though a statute touches on rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
inent, it must be construed to be constitutional if at all possible."3 Never-
theless, the amount of consideration which has been afforded this point
6. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
7. See National Maritime Union of Am. v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 177 (D. D.C.
191).
8. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 70 Sup. Ct. 674, 702, rehearing
denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1017 (1950).
9. Id. at 707.
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
11. Comments, 48 Micii. L. REv. 337 (1950), 4 MIIA^x L. Q. 67 (1949).
12. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
see National Maritime Union of Am. v. Herzog, supra note 5, at 183 (dissenting opioion).
13. National Maritime Union of Am. v. Herzog, supra note 5, at 155; see West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra note 10, at 646 (dissenting opinion).
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in the decisions emphasizes the high regard with which the courts look
upon these civil liberties.
The wide variance of opinion as to the specific freedom of speech vio-
lated and the true resultant evil to be avoided demonstrates the difficulty
of applying the clear and present danger test to the situation. The require-
ment that an oath be taken setting forth the affiliations and beliefs of the
individual is perhaps a violation of a freedom of silence rather than of
speech. It has been suggested that such a liberty is protected by the Fifth
Amendment rather than by the First.' 4
It is the contention of the National Labor Relations Board that Con-
gress has afforded a facility for the unions, the privilege of becoming an
exclusive bargaining agent, and that § 9(h) is merely a condition to qualify
the recipient of the favor.' 5 It is true there have been many situations in
which Congress has been upheld in its power to condition the utilization
of facilities afforded upon compliance with certain conditions, as in the
use of the mails.16 However, the Fifth Amendment guards against the im-
position of arbitrary and discriminatory conditions.17  The question then
becomes a matter of whether the requirement established by Congress that
the affidavits be furnished is reasonably calculated to accomplish the pro.
tection of interstate commerce from political strikes without imposing an
extremely unfair burden on particular individuals or groups.
Congress decided the means selected would best accomplish this end
when it amended the National Labor Relations Act. In deciding that § 9(h)
does not violate the Constitution, the Court affirmed the findings of Con-
gress and refused to substitute its judgment as to the necessity of such re-
strictions. There is danger that, unless the decision of the Court be re-
stricted very narrowly to the specific situation involved, it could prove a
precedent for permitting Congress to infringe upon First Amendment rights
indirectly and gradually diminish individual liberties.
CONTRACTS - ASSIGNMENT OF WARRANTY - QUANTITY
A vendor of whiskey in storage gave to the original vendee a warranty,
against excess loss in quantity,' which was assigned to the sub-purchaser
in a general sale of assets. Held, the sub-purchaser, as assignee, can enforce
the warranty of quantity against the original vendor, though there is no
14. See Nutting, Freedom of Silence, 47 Micu. L. REV. 181, 219 (1948).
15. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 8, at 679.
16. Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921); Lewis Publishing
Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
17. cf. Walling v. Sun Publishing Co., 47 F. Supp. 180, 191 (W.D. Tenn. 1942).
1. The warranty was against excess outage. Outage is loss of content from seepage,
evaporation or whatever the cause. Excess outage is all outage beyond that allowed by
the Government for tax computation purposes. Hunter-Wilson Distilling Co. v. Foust
Distilling Co., 181 F.2d 543, 544 (3d Cir. 1950).
